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regime be crossed some critical pollution stock threshold. We first describe
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to avoid the loss of natural self-cleaning capacity or deliberately cross the
threshold and switch to the low regeneration regime. We show under fairly
general assumptions that there exists a unique critical pollution stock level
such that thresholds located below this level will induce a switch from the
high to the low regeneration regime while thresholds located above it will
imply maintaining the high regime forever. We characterize the optimal
policies in these two scenarios and show that triggering the low regeneration
regime requires an upward jump of the resource consumption rate at the
optimal switching time.
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1 Introduction
That the natural self-cleaning capacities of the environment could deterio-
rate in the long run is now a well identified problem having been received
impressive research efforts both theoretically and empirically oriented dur-
ing the last forty years, say from the pioneer theoretical works of Forster
(1973, 1975), Keeler, Spencer and Zeckhauser (1973) and Plourde (1972) at
the beginning of the ninety seventies.
Typically the deterioration process may be either progressive or abrupt
that is leading to some catastrophe, resulting in fine for the both progressive
and catastrophic deterioration cases either in a partial or a complete loss of
the assimilative capacity of the environment. The deterioration process may
be modeled either as an exogenous process, that is purely time dependent,
or linked to the flow of pollution generated by the economic activity and/or
the stock of accumulated pollution, thus made be endogenous. As far as
the process is endogenous, new options are opening : The society could use
more or less polluting resources or resort to more or less complete abatement
programs reducing the flow of pollution rejected in the environment. Last
the structural relationships of the models may be either certain or include
random components.
The effects of a damaged environment upon the wellbeing of the society
may be too either progressive or catastrophic as pioneered by Cropper (1976),
catastrophic wellbeing effects being not necessarily linked to catastrophic
changes in the assimilative capacity. In most models of wellbeing catastro-
phes, including the seminal model of Cropper, the natural self-regeneration
process is not affected by the catastrophe, and neither is triggered the well-
being catastrophe by a sudden change in the environment quality. Sym-
metrically in many models of catastrophic changes of the self-regeneration
regime, the regime switch does not result in catastrophic falls of welfare, at
least in the short run. The reason is that a drastic change in the natural
process of pollution accumulation does not translate into a discontinuity of
the pollution stock path but rather in a discontinuity in its time derivative.
Most of the studies of the catastrophic loss of the self-regeneration power
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of the environment adopt a random model framework 1. The time at which
the catastrophe occurs is a random variable in time depending models. The
instantaneous probability of disruption is a random function of the pollution
stock in stock depending models, contrary to the main corpus of the literature
devoted to the progressive deterioration in which the structural relationships
are generally assumed to be certain 2. A notable exception is the recent study
of Prieur, Tidball and Withagen (2011) in which the assimilative power of the
environment is totally annihilated once the pollution stock overshoots some
definite and perfectly identified critical level. In the present paper we retain
a similar framework, that is a partial equilibrium model of a closed economy
without uncertainty. However we assume that the resource generating the
pollution flow is inexhaustible and that the loss of self-regenerative capacities
is only partial as in Polasky, de Zeew and Wagener (2011). Thus there can
occur an irreversible shift of the self-regeneration regime once the pollution is
gone beyond its critical level, but not necessarily an irreversible accumulation
of the pollution stock since after the shift some assimilative capacity of the
environment is preserved, although along optimal paths in many models, the
pollution stock is permanently increasing for sufficiently low initial pollution
stocks3.
In this kind of model there exist two types of policies. The first one
consists in avoiding to trigger the catastrophe by restricting the use of the
polluting resource in order to keep the pollution stock within its safety limit.
The second one consists in deliberately entering the new world of slowly
self-regenerating environment and in choosing the date at which this new
world must be visited. We show that under fairly standard assumptions
determining which policy is the optimal one may be given a very simple
formulation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In
1See Polasky, de Zeeuw and Wagener (2011) for a generous account of this literature.
See also Athanassoglu and Xepapadeas (2012) for the case where precise probability laws
are difficult to ascertain.
2See Cesar and de Zeeuw (1995), Farzin and Tahvonen (1996), Tahvonen (1995, 1997),
Tahvonen and Salo (1996), Tahvonen and Withagen (1996), Toman and Withagen (1996)
and Brock and Starret (2003) for progressive loss models with certain structural relation-
ships.
3Most models are assuming stationary or increasing needs in energy services, thus
generating a never decreasing pollution stock , clean renewable options and/or abatement
options being not open in this type of models.
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Section 3 we characterize the policies permitting to preserve the highly effi-
cient self-regenerative power of the environment. In Section 4 we determine
the conditions under which either policy is the optimal one. We examine the
main characteristics of the policies triggering the regime switch in Section 5.
We conclude in Section 6.
2 The model and preliminary results
2.1 Assumptions and notations
We consider an economy in which the consumption of ready to use services
of some resource generates a net surplus for the final users.
The resource stock is infinite, we denote by x(t) its instantaneous con-
sumption rate. The average cost having to be engaged for supplying the
services to the final users is constant and thus may be assumed to be nil
without loss of generality.
Using the resource for providing ready to use services implies pollutant
rejections in the environment. Let ζ be the unitary pollution content of the
resource so that the current new pollution flow amounts to ζx(t) at time t.
This new pollution flow supplies the pollution stock present in the environ-
ment denoted by Z(t). The environment has some self-regeneration capacity
which can be destroyed and forever when the pollution stock overshoots some
critical level Zi. To keep matters as simple as possible we assume that before
and after this bad event if any, the assimilative capacity of the environ-
ment is proportional to the current pollution stock falling from αh down to
α` , 0 < α` < αh , once Z(t) > Z
i so that the dynamics of Z(t) is driven by :
Z˙(t) =

ζx(t)− αhZ(t) , if Z(τ) ≤ Zi , τ ∈ [0, t]
ζx(t)− α`Z(t) , other cases
(2.1)
We evidently assume that the initial pollution stock denoted by Z0 is lower
than the critical stock Zi : Z0 < Zi.
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The pollution stock Z is generating instantaneous damages h(Z(t)) at
time t where h is a C2 function strictly increasing and strictly convex, with
h(0) = 0 , h′(0) = 0 , and limZ↑∞ h(Z) = +∞ and limZ↑∞ h′(Z) = +∞.
Let u(x(t)) be the instantaneous gross surplus resulting from the con-
sumption of the services provided by x(t). We assume that u is a C2 func-
tion, strictly increasing and strictly concave with limx↓0 u′(x) = +∞ and
limx↑∞ u′(x) = 0 4. u′ is sometimes denoted by p since the marginal surplus
is the demand price of the services supplied to the users : p(x) = u′(x) is the
inverse of the direct demand function itself denoted by xd(p).
The social rate of discount ρ is assumed to be constant through time and
strictly positive.
The social welfare W is the standard criterion, the sum of the discounted
instantaneous well-beings:
W =
∫ ∞
0
{u(x(t))− h(Z(t))} e−ρtdt.
2.2 The social planner problem
The social planner problem is to determine the resource consumption path
{x(t), t ≥ 0} maximizing W under the constraint (2.1), the initial condition
Z(0) = Z0, and the constraint x(t) ≥ 0. Given the assumption u′(0) = +∞,
this last constraint will never be active and may be discarded.
We denote by −λ the costate variable of Z and by H the current value
Hamiltonian of the problem :
H = u(x(t))− h(Z(t))− λ(t)[ζx(t)− α(t)Z(t)]
where α(t) ∈ {αh, α`} is given by the history of Z according to (2.1).
The first order conditions are :
u′(x(t)) = ζλ(t) (2.2)
4Note that we do not exclude negative gross surplus for low consumption rates.
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and at any time t at which λ is differentiable :
λ˙ = (p+ α(t))λ(t)− h′(Z(t)) (2.3)
Other conditions have to be taken into account when Z(t) = Zi, we
discuss later in Sections 3 and 5.
Last the transversality condition at infinity is :
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλ(t)Z(t) = 0. (2.4)
2.3 Benchmarks
It is useful for the clarity of the arguments developed in the following sections,
to look at what could be the optimal consumption paths absent the regime
switch problem in a system where the proportional self-regeneration rate is
some fixed rate α : α > 0.
In such a system the dynamics of the shadow marginal cost of the resource
services, or its optimal price, denoted by p(t) : p(t) = ζλ(t), is obtained by
differentiating this last equality and substituting (2.3) for λ˙(t) to obtain :
p˙(t) = (ρ+ α)p(t)− ζh′(Z(t)). (2.5)
The isocline p˙ = 0 in the (p, Z) plane is defined as :
(p, Z) : p˙ = 0 ⇒ p = ζ
ρ+ α
· h′(Z), (2.6)
so that :
dp
dZ
∣∣∣
p˙=0
=
ζ
ρ+ α
· h′′(Z) > 0. (2.7)
We denote by ppk(Z), k ∈ {h, `}, the function defining this locus p˙ = 0
under the regime k.
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As for Z its dynamics is given by :
Z˙(t) = ζxd(p(t))− αZ(t), (2.8)
and the isocline Z˙ = 0 is defined by :
(p, Z) : Z˙ = 0 ⇒ xd(p) = α
ζ
Z ⇒ p = u′(α
ζ
Z), (2.9)
hence :
dp
dZ
∣∣∣
Z˙=0
=
α
ζ
u′(
α
ζ
) < 0. (2.10)
We denote by pZk (Z), k ∈ {h, `}, the function defining the locus Z˙ = 0
under the regime k.
The asymptotic optimal stationary pollution stock Z∗ and price p∗ under
the regime α are given as :
u′(
α
ζ
Z∗) =
ζ
ρ+ α
· h′(Z∗) and p∗ = u′(α
ζ
Z∗). (2.11)
The pair (p∗, Z∗) is a saddle point since u
′′
< 0 and h
′′
> 0.
Sensitivity analysis of the long run steady state
Differentiating (2.6) and (2.9) w.r.t. the self-regeneration rate α results
in :
∂p
∂α
∣∣∣
p˙=0
= − ζ
(ρ+ α)2
· h′(Z) < 0, (2.12)
and:
∂p
∂α
∣∣∣
Z˙=0
=
1
ζ
u
′′
(
α
(ζ)Z
< 0. (2.13)
Thus the higher is the assimilative capacity of the environment the lower
are located the both isoclines p˙ = 0 and Z˙ = 0 in the (p, Z) space, as
illustrated in Figure 1 for α = αh and α = α` where for any Z both p
p
h(Z) <
pp`(Z) and p
Z
h (Z) < p
Z
` (Z). Figure 1 suggests that p
∗ is decreasing with α
while Z∗ may either increase or decrease.
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Figure 1 here
Differentiating (2.11) w.r.t. α, we obtain :
- first :
dp∗
dα
=
1
ρ+α
u
′′
[Z∗ · h′′ + α
ζ
u′]
−α
ζ
u′′ + ζ
ρ+α
h′′
< 0 (2.14)
so that as suggested by Figure 1, p∗ is decreasing with α ;
- second :
dZ∗
dα
=
1
ζ
Z∗ · u′′ + ζ
(ρ+α)2
h′
−α
ζ
u′′ + ζ
ρ+α
h′′
(2.15)
the sign of which may be either positive or negative.
However the sign of dZ
∗
dα
may be given a very simple expression depending
upon the elasticity of the demand for the resource services, the social rate of
discount and the self-regenerating rate.
Substituting u′ for ζ
ρ+α
h′ (c.f. (2.11)) in the numerator of (2.15) we
obtain 1
ζ
Z∗u
′′
+ 1
ρ+α
u′. Hence the numerator is positive iff η∗ > ρ+α
α
where :
η∗ = − u
′(α
ζ
Z∗)
u′′(α
ζ
Z∗)
· 1α
ζ
Z∗
,
is the absolute value, η, of the price elasticity of the resource services demand
xd(p) at p = p∗ = u′(α
ζ
Z∗).
Given that the denominator of (2.15) is positive, we conclude that :
dZ∗
dα
S 0 according to η∗ S 1 + ρ
α
.
Similar sensitivity analysis w.r.t. the other parameters of the model, ρ and
ζ, lead to the same qualitative conclusions. While the sign of dp
∗
dφ
, φ ∈ ρ, ζ is
unambiguous, the sign of dZ
∗
dφ
is strongly dependent on the price elasticity of
the demand. These signs are compiled in the below Table 1 and the analytical
expressions of the derivatives are given in Appendix A.1 .
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η∗ < 1 η∗ = 1 1 < η∗ < 1 + ρ
α
η∗ = 1 + ρ
α
1 + ρ
α
< η∗
dZ∗/dα − − − 0 +
dZ∗/dρ + + + + +
dZ∗/dζ + 0 − − −
dp∗/dα − − − − −
dp∗/dρ − − − − −
dp∗/dζ + + + + +
Table 1: Signs of the derivatives of Z∗ and p∗
Note that the demand elasticities at which the signs of dZ
∗
dα
and dZ
∗
dζ
are
reversed are not the same. Also remark that assuming a surplus function
u(x) = log x, so easy to manipulate in some exercises, entails very specific
implications concerning the sensitivity of Z∗ : The long run optimal pollu-
tion stock does not depend upon the pollution content of the resource and
decreases with the proportional self-regeneration rate. The same kinds of
remarks apply for quadratic surplus functions along which the demand elas-
ticity is varying.
In Figure 1 the optimal paths are the trajectories pFh (Z) and p
F
` (Z) for
respectively the high and low self-regeneration regimes. Figure 1 is drawn
assuming that η > 1 + ρ
α
since Z∗h > Z
∗ > Z∗` .
From now we assume that Zi is smaller than Z∗h whatever be Z
∗
` , since
for Zi > Z∗h and Z
0 < Zi, neglecting the switch possibility, the solution of
the social planner problem is such that Zi is never overshot.
2.4 Determining the optimal policy
Assume that Zi has been attained at some date, then at this date the society
is facing two options :
- the first one is to choose a policy maintaining the high natural self-
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regeneration rate αh, that is never overshoot Z
i;
- the second one is to engage the low self-regenerating process, but for-
ever, by overshooting Zi 5.
The value of either policy when at Zi does not depend on what has been
done before. Thus the whole structure of the optimal path is determined
by the best choice when at Zi. Once this best choice problem is solved it
remains to determine the best way for attaining Zi, best way which in turn
depends upon the decision having to be made when at Zi.
2.5 Notations
Although we are working alternatively with the high and the slow self-
regeneration regime, the context is always sufficiently evident to be aware
of which regime is under consideration thanks to the notations introduced in
Sub-section 2.3 supra.
The only additional notations we cannot escape from are relative to the
behavior of the different paths when attaining Zi.
We denote by ti the time at which the critical pollution stock Z
i is at-
tained, and by xi the maximum consumption rate of the resource permitting
to keep alive the high self-regeneration regime when at Zi : xi = αh
ζ
Zi.
When there is no discontinuity in a flow variable or a costate variable
at ti we use the superscript i for the value of the variable at this date ti.
5Contrary to the case of a finite stock of resource it is never optimal to stay for some
time at Zi before eventually switching to the low self-regenerating regime. In the present
setting, while staying at Zi, the state of the system does not change. In the case of a
non-renewable resource there exists another state variable X, the current resource stock.
Thus when staying at Zi, one state variable Z is left unchanged while X, the other state
variable, decreases. In such a context, it may happen optimal to stay at Zi for a while
because now the value of what has to be done depends upon both Z and X, thus upon
that has been done before attaining Zi. See Prieur, Tidball and Withagen (2011) for
further developments and simulations along these lines, in the more dramatic context
where α` = 0.
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For example λi is the value of λ(ti) in this case. This is typically what
occurs along the paths preserving the high self-regeneration capacities of the
environment.
However along the paths triggering the regime shift generally the flow
variables are discontinuous. Then we use t−i and t
+
i as the time argument
for respectively the left and the right limits of the variable at ti. For exam-
ple λ(t−i ) = limt↑tiλ(t) and λ(t
+
i ) = limt↓tiλ(t). To simplify even more the
notations we denote respectively by λi− and λ
i
+ the limits λ(t
−
i ) and λ(t
+
i ).
3 Best maintaining policies
In this section we determine the best policy preserving the initial high self-
regenerating rate αh. We call these policies Best Maintaining Policies (B. M.
P.).
The problem to be solved has the same objective function W , but since
the highly efficient self-regenerating regime is permanently at work then the
dynamics of Z is given by:
Z˙(t) = ζx(t)− αhZ(t) , t ≥ 0 , Zi > Z0 ≥ 0 , (3.1)
to which must be added the following constraint in order that (3.1) holds for
all t ≥ 0:
Zi − Z(t) ≥ 0 , t ≥ 0 . (3.2)
The current value Hamiltonian must be modified accordingly:
H = u(x(t))− h(Z(t))− λ(t) [ζx(t)− αhZ(t)] .
Denote by ν the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint (3.2), then
the current value Lagrangian denoted by L reads:
L = H + ν(t) [Zi − Z(t)] .
The first order condition relative to x, that is (2.2), does not change, neither
the transversality condition (2.4).
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The dynamics of λ must now satisfy:
λ˙(t) = (ρ+ αh)λ(t)− h′(Z(t))− ν(t) (3.3)
ν(t) ≥ 0 , Zi − Z(t) ≥ 0 and ν(t) [Zi − Z(t)] = 0 . (3.4)
Note that initially the constraint (3.2) does not bind since Z0 < Zi, hence
ν(t) = 0 and (3.3) reduces to (2.3). This is implying that the dynamics of p
and Z are given by (2.5) and (2.6) with α = αh, up to the time ti at which
the critical stock Zi is approached. Thus the optimal path in the (p, Z)
plane is this trajectory (M) in Figure ?? crossing the curve Z˙ = 0 at Z = Zi
and tangent to the vertical through Zi at this point. From ti the constraint
Zi − Z ≥ 0 begins to be active and forever: the system stays indefinitely in
this state.
Figure 2 here
Transversality condition at ti
Let V m(Zi) be the continuation value of the B. M. P. when at Zi:
V m(Zi) =
∫ ∞
ti
[
u(xi)− h(Zi)] e−ρ(t−ti)dt = 1
ρ
[
u(xi)− h(Zi)] .(3.5)
For Z0 < Zi and Zi ≤ Z∗h, the B. M. P. path may be seen equivalently as
the solution of:
max
{x,ti}
∫ ti
0
[u(x(t))− h(Z(t))] e−ρtdt+ e−ρtiV m(Zi)
s.t. (3.1) and (3.2)
Let H(t) be the present value Hamiltonian: H(t) = e−ρtH(t). Then a
well-known transversality condition at ti is:
lim
t↑ti
H(t) +
∂
∂ti
[
e−ρtiV m(Zi)
]
= 0 .
Substituting for H(t) and V m(Zi) results in:
u(x(ti))− h(Z(ti))− λ(ti) [ζx(ti)− αhZ(ti)] = u(xi)− h(Zi) ,
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an equation clearly satisfied for x(ti) = x
i and Z(ti) = Z
i since then the last
term into brackets of the L. H. S. of the equation is nil.
Locating the maximum of V m(Zi)
As it will become clear in Sub-section 4.2, it is important to determine
the location of this critical stock, we denote by Zˆi, at which V m(Zi) attains
its maximum, within the range (0, Z∗h).
Let us show that the continuation value of the B. M. P. is first increasing
and next decreasing within the interval (0, Z∗h). From x
i = αhZ
i/ζ, we get:
dV m
dZi
=
1
ρ
[
αh
ζ
u′(xi)− h′(Zi)
]
d2V m
d(Zi)2
=
1
ρ
[(
αh
ζ
)2
u′′(xi)− h′′(Zi)
]
< 0 .
Let Zˆi be that solution of:
u′
(
αh
ζ
Zi
)
=
ζ
αh
h′(Zi) , (3.6)
then:
dV m
dZi
T 0 according to Zi S Zˆi .
The pollution stock Zˆi at which V m attains its maximum is smaller than the
long run pollution stock Z∗h towards which would converge the optimal stock
of an efficient system free of the switching threat. The reason is illustrated
in the below Figure 3. The L. H. S. of the equation (3.6) is nothing but than
the function defining the isocline Z˙ = 0 for α = αh, and the graph of the
R. H. S. of (3.6), ζh′(Z)/αh, is located above the graph of ζh′(Z)/(ρ + α)
defining the isocline p˙ = 0 for α = αh.
Figure 3 here
For small critical pollution stocks Zi the blockaded consumption rate xi
is also small meaning that u′(xi) is high while h′(Zi) is low, resulting in a
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positive marginal balance sheet u′(xi) − h′(Zi). But u′(xi) is a decreasing
function of Zi while h′(Zi) is an increasing function. Thus the marginal
balance sheet is progressively deteriorating staying in the black as far as Zi
stays under Zˆi and going in the red for larger levels of the critical stock Zi.
Determining the stationary values of λ and ν once blockaded at Zi
According to (3.3), the stationary value of λ once Zi is attained, λi, must
satisfy:
λ˙ = 0 = (ρ+ αh)λ
i − h′(Zi)− νi .
According to the F.O.C. (2.2) relative to x, λi = 1
ζ
u′
(
αh
ζ
Zi
)
, hence6:
νi+ =
ρ+ αh
ζ
u′
(
αh
ζ
Zi
)
− h′(Zi) .
For Zi < Z∗h, p
F
h (Z
i) > pph(Z
i) (see Figure 2) meaning that u′
(
αh
ζ
Zi
)
>
ζ
ρ+αh
h′(Zi), hence νi+ > 0. For Z
i = Z∗h, then ν
i = 0.
Clearly:
dλi
dZi
=
αh
ζ2
u′′
(
αh
ζ
Zi
)
< 0 ,
dνi
dZi
=
αh(ρ+ αh)
ζ2
u′′
(
αh
ζ
Zi
)
− h′′(Zi) < 0 .
The higher is the critical pollution stock Zi, the lower is the long run shadow
marginal cost of the pollution stock and the lower is the Lagrange multiplier
associated to the no-switch constraint, as expected.
The B. M. P. path as the "most slowly" approach to Zi
To get a complete picture of the B. M. P. path it remains to determine
λ0, the initial level of λ. Given Z
0 < Zi, for any λ0 ≥ 0, the system:
λ˙(t) = (ρ+ αh)λ(t)− h′(Z(t)) (3.7)
Z˙(t) = ζxd(λ(t))− αhZ(t) (3.8)
6Note that ν(t) is discontinuous at ti, nil for t < ti, ν
i
− = 0, and jumping up to ν
i
+ at
ti.
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has a unique solution
{(
λ˜(t, λ0), Z˜(t, λ0)
)
, t ≥ 0
}
such that λ˜(0, λ0) = λ0
and Z˜(0, λ0) = Z
0.
Let Λ0 be the set of λ0 values for which Z˜(t, λ0) attains the critical level
Zi. For any λ0 ∈ Λ0 let us define t˜i(λ0) as:
t˜i(λ0) = inf t : Z˜(t, λ0) ≥ Zi .
Then the value of λ0 characterizing the optimal path is this value for which:
xd
(
ζλ˜(t˜i(λ0), λ0)
)
= xi
This is the value of λ0 corresponding to the trajectory (M) in Figure 2.
Since the trajectories {λ, Z} solution of the autonomous differential sys-
tem (3.7)-(3.8) do not cross, then to a lower Zi corresponds a higher λ0 and
the same applies to a higher Z0 (see Figure 2):
∂λ0
∂Zi
< 0 and
∂λ0
∂Z0
> 0 . (3.9)
A more stringent Zi constraint resolves into a higher penalty imposed upon
the resource consumption before the Zi border is reached. A higher initial
pollution stock has the same consequences on the resource consumption path.
According to a well-known property of the autonomous systems7 the delay
needed to go from Z0 to Zi is the larger the more distant is the trajectory
satisfying the F. O. C's from the saddle branch trajectory pFh (Z) amongst
those trajectories located above the saddle branch.
A first implication of this property is that, when the policy is the B.
M. policy, the required delay for attaining Zi is the longest possible one.
Maintaining the high self-regenerative capacity of the environment translates
into delaying as far as possible the time at which the preserving constraint
will begin to be binding. It is typically a case of 'most slowly' approach.
A second implication worth having to be pointed out is that, increasing
the penalty: dZi < 0 =⇒ dλ0 > 0, thus inducing a reduced consumption rate
7See Caputo (2005), p 371-373, for a detailed argument.
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before attaining Zi and a correlative slow down of the pollution accumulation
rate, does not delay the attainment of the critical pollution stock: dti/dZ
i >
0.
To conclude:
Proposition 1 Assuming a sufficiently low triggering pollution stock Zi:
Zi < Z∗h, hence a no switch constraint Z
i − Z ≥ 0 binding in the long run,
then for any initial pollution stock Z0 lower than the critical stock, the paths
of resource consumption and pollution stock generated by the Best Maintain-
ing Policies are two phases paths:
• a first phase of decreasing resource consumption and increasing pollu-
tion stock, ending at the time ti when the pollution stock attains the
critical level Zi and simultaneously the resource consumption rate is
reduced to this rate xi for which the pollution emission flow ζxi is bal-
anced by the self-regeneration flow αhZ
i. The lower is the critical level
Zi the shorter is the delay ti required for attaining Z
i.
• a second phase of infinite duration where the resource consumption rate
is blockaded at xi, the pollution stock being maintained at its critical
level Zi.
4 Evaluation of the regime switch opportunity
Assume that the pollution stock is at its critical level Zi and that the society
wants to enter the slow self-regenerating regime, that is wants to adopt what
we call the Best Switching Policy (B. S. P.). Two problems arise, first how
to engage the switch and second, what to do next.
Engaging the switch is not a true problem. That can be made by boosting
the current use of the resource at any rate arbitrarily larger than xi during any
arbitrarily short time interval, in brief by an arbitrarily small impulse without
any noticeable implication upon the further development of the pollution
stock through time.
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Once the switch has been triggered, the society is facing a slow self-
regenerating system with an initial condition Z = Zi. Thus the best is to
walk along the pFl (Z) trajectory pointing towards (p
∗
l , Z
∗
l ).
Let us denote by λi+ the value of λ at the time t
+
i when the economy
begins to evolve along this path, that is (c.f. (2.2)):
λi+ =
1
ρ
pFl (Z
i) =
1
ρ
u′(xi+) , (4.1)
where xi+ is solving u
′(x) = pFl (Z
i).
Define Z¯i as the pollution stock level at which the curve pFl (Z) is crossing
the curve pZh (Z). Since we assume that Z
i < Z∗h, then Z¯
i < min{Z∗h, Z∗l } as
illustrated in the below Figure 4:
Figure 4 here
4.1 Pro and con switch arguments
For Zi larger than Z¯i, the B. M. P. is more rewarding than the B. S. P.
Consider for example an hypothetical critical pollution stock Zi1: Z¯
i < Zi1 <
Z∗l . At any time after ti the B. S. P. is generating a lower consumption
rate since pZh (Z
i
1) < p
F
l (Z) for all Z, Z ∈ (Zi1, Z∗l ), together with a larger
pollution stock, Z > Zi1.
However the B. S. P. may present some advantages for critical pollution
stocks smaller than Z¯i but only for sufficiently small levels. Consider for
example the critical level Zi2 in Figure 4. Along the B. S. P. path p
F
l (Z) the
resource consumption rate begins to be significantly higher than along the B.
M. P. path because pFl (Z
i
2) < p
Z
h (Z
i
2) while the pollution stock is only slightly
higher than Zi2. Thus initially, that is within some time interval after the
switch, the current net surplus is larger under the B. S. P. In the case of Figure
??, p∗l , the asymptotic price under the B. S. P. is lower than p
Z
h (Z
i
2) meaning
that the consumption rate advantage of the B. S. P. is maintained forever
after the switch. Thus the cost-benefit balance of the switch is critically
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dependent upon the path of higher pollution damages induced by the switch.
For a sufficiently low damage function the balance sheet is in the black but
goes in the red for high damage functions.
However there exists more intricate cases in which p∗l is higher than p
Z
h (Z
i)
together with pZh (Z
i) > pFl (Z
i). In these cases the initial advantage of a
higher consumption rate following the switch is progressively vanishing and
eventually results in a lower consumption rate after some delay. In between
the growing pollution stock is generating larger and larger damages as usual
after the switch. This case is illustrated by the critical stock Zi3 in Figure
4. Let us define Z˜il as this pollution stock for which p
Z
h (Z
i) = p∗l . Then
p∗l > p
Z
h (Z
i
3) > p
F
l (Z
i
3) for any Z
i
3: Z˜
i
l < Z
i
3 < Z¯
i, so that, after the switch,
there must exist a first phase during which the consumption rate is higher
than the consumption rate at which the consumption is blockaded under the
B. M. P., followed by a second infinite phase during which the consumption
rate is lower contrary to the case Zi = Zi2. But because Z
i
3 > Z
i
2, then the
asymptotic loss generated by higher and higher pollution stocks is lower in
the case Zi = Zi3 than in the case Z
i = Zi2: h(Z
∗
h)− h(Zi3) < h(Z∗h)− h(Zi2).
Whatever tricky seem the above pro and con arguments, let us show that
the relative advantage of the B. S. P. versus the B. M. P. may be given a
very simple expression as a function of Zi.
4.2 Determination of the optimal choice when at Z i
Let us denote by V s(Zi) the value of the B. S. P. when at Zi, Zi ≤ Z¯i (< Z∗h):
V s(Zi) =
∫ ∞
ti
[u(x(t))− h(Z(t))] e−ρ(t−ti)dt ,
where {(x(t), Z(t)) , t ≥ ti} is the B. S. P. path after ti.
According to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (H. J. B.) equation, V s(Zi)
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may be given the equivalent following expression:
V s(Zi) =
1
ρ
{
u(xi+)− h(Zi)− λi+
[
ζxi+ − αlZi
]}
=
1
ρ
{
u(xi+)− h(Zi)−
1
ζ
u′(xi+)
[
ζxi+ − αlZi
]}
(4.2)
where xi+ is given by (4.1) as a function of Z
i. This is the expression with
which we shall work. We show in Appendix A.2 that V s(Zi) is decreasing as
expected and concave:
dV s
dZi
< 0 and
d2V s
d (Zi)2
< 0 . (4.3)
To determine the optimal policy we first show that8:
V m(0) < V s(0) and V m(Z¯i) > V s(Z¯i) ,
and second that B(Zi), the comparative advantage of the B. S. P., B(Zi) ≡
V s(Zi)−V m(Zi), is a decreasing function of Zi over the range (0, Z¯i). Hence
we may conclude that there exists a unique level of the critical pollution stock,
we denote by ZiR: 0 < Z
i
R < Z¯
i, at which the comparative advantage of the
switch is reversed, from the black to the red.
Values of V m and V s at the boundaries of (0, Z¯i)
For Zi = Z¯i, then xi+ = x
i and (4.2) may be rewritten as:
V s(Z¯i) =
1
ρ
{
u(xi)− h(Z¯i)− 1
ζ
u′(xi)
[
ζxi − αlZ¯i
]}
=
1
ρ
[
u(xi)− h(Z¯i)]− 1
ρζ
u′(xi)
[
ζxi − αlZ¯i
]
= V m(Z¯i)− 1
ρζ
u′(xi)Z˙(t+i ) ,
where Z˙(t+i ) is the rate of change of Z(t) immediately after the switch under
the B. S. P. Hence Z˙(t+i ) > 0 and:
V m(Z¯i) > V s(Z¯i) . (4.4)
8Strictly speaking, in the below L. H. S. inequality V m(0) must be understood as
limZi↓0 V m(Zi).
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Next, since h(0) = 0 and xi = αhZ
i/ζ, then:
V m(0) = lim
Zi↓0
{
u
(
αh
ζ
Zi
)
− h(Zi)
}
= lim
Zi↓0
u
(
αh
ζ
Zi
)
= u(0) ,
and denoting by xi+(0) the limit of x
i
+ as a function of Z
i as Zi → 0:
V s(0) =
1
ρ
lim
Zi↓0
{
u
(
xi+(Z
i)
)− h(Zi)− 1
ζ
u′
(
xi+(Z
i)
) [
ζxi+(Z
i)− αlZi
]}
=
1
ρ
{
u
(
xi+(0)
)− u′ (xi+(0))xi+(0)}
Then by the concavity of u:
u′
(
xi+(0)
) [
xi+(0)− 0
]
< u
(
xi+(0)
)− u(0) ,
equivalently:
V m(0) =
1
ρ
u(0) <
1
ρ
{
u
(
xi+(0)
)− u′ (xi+(0))xi+(0)} = V s(0) .(4.5)
Locating the maximum of V m(Zi) with respect to the upper boundary Z¯i
Would V m(Zi) be a monotonously increasing function of Zi we could
conclude from (4.4), (4.5) and V s(Zi) decreasing that there exists a unique
critical pollution stock at which the sign of B(Zi) is reversed.
However we have shown in Section 3 that in the (p, Z) space, the locus
of (price , pollution stock) pairs at which V m(Zi) attains its maximum is
defined by the condition (3.6):
p = u′
(
αh
ζ
Zi
)
=
ζ
αh
h′(Zi) .
Thus in order that the maximum of V m be attained at the upper border Z¯i
of the interval [0, Z¯i] it must be the case that (see Figure 5):
pFl (Z¯
i) =
ζ
αh
h′
(
Z¯i
)
. (4.6)
Figure 5 here
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Let α¯h be this value of αh for which (4.6) is satisfied:
α¯h = ζ
h′
(
Z¯i
)
pFl
(
Z¯i
)
Then:
Zˆi T Z¯i according to αh S α¯h .
Thus, given all the other fundamentals of the model, for a sufficiently
low αh, the maximum of V
m(Zi) is attained at some Zi outside the (0, Z¯i)
range. In such a case we may not conclude from the mere inequalities (4.4)
and (4.5), the qualitative properties (4.3) of V s and the concavity of V m,
that there exists a unique critical pollution stock within the range (0, Z¯i)
at which the sign of B(Zi) is reversed. The below Figure 6 illustrates why,
under the above characteristics of V m and V s, the set of Zi values for which
B(Zi) is positive may be made of disconnected intervals, (0, Zi1) and (Z
i
2, Z
i
3),
0 < Zi1 < Z
i
2 < Z
i
3 < Z¯
i.
Figure 6 here
What has to be pointed out is that the qualification αh < α¯h is a qual-
ification 'given all other fundamentals of the model'. Thus a 'low' αh must
be understood 'for a given αl', meaning that such cases could possibly ap-
pear only when the discrepancy between the most and the least efficient
self-regenerating regimes is not too large. These cases are cases in which
choosing either regime is not an easy cost-benefit assessment exercise, hence
the necessity of proving the following property of the B(Zi) function.
The comparative advantage B(Zi) is a decreasing function of Zi
To prove that B(Zi) is decreasing over (0, Z¯i) we look at B as the sum
of two components, obtained from the H. J. B. expressions of both V m(Zi)
and V s(Zi).
Consider for example the hypothetical critical level Zi2 in Figure 4. Choos-
ing the B. S. P. rather than the B. M. P. may be seen as a move from
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xi2 ≡ xd
(
pZh (Z
i
2)
)
up to xi+2 ≡ xd
(
pFl (Z
i
2)
)
corresponding to two successive
changes. The first change is a change of the self-regeneration regime at xi2
given. The second change, from xi2 to x
i
+2, is the change of the initial re-
source consumption rate of the path satisfying the F. O. C's under the low
self-regeneration regime once the regime shift has been engaged.
Let us denote by ∆−(Zi) the loss (in absolute value) due to the regime
switch at xi fixed and by ∆+(Zi) the gain resulting from a better adaptation,
to the new self-regeneration regime, of the initial consumption rate xi+ rather
than xi.
From the H. J. B. expression of V m(Zi):
V m(Zi) =
1
ρ
{
u(xi)− h(Zi)− λi [ζxi − αhZi]} (4.7)
and the expression (4.2) of V s(Zi), the loss induced by the regime switch
absent any accommodation of the initial consumption rate xi, is given by:
∆−(Zi) =
1
ρ
{
u(xi)− h(Zi)− λi [ζxi − αhZi]}
−1
ρ
{
u(xi)− h(Zi)− λi [ζxi − αlZi]}
where λi = u′(xi)/ζ is this value of λ prevailing both:
• at ti along the constant path of the B. M. P. once Zi has been attained,
and also:
• at t+i along a path which would satisfy all the necessary conditions un-
der the low self-regeneration regime starting with an initial consump-
tion rate xi.
Hence:
∆−(Zi) =
1
ζ
u′(xi) [αh − αl]Zi .
Let us turn to ∆+(Zi). Using the derivative of the H. J. B. equation
w.r.t. x, the gain resulting from the adaptation of the initial consumption
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rate to the low self-regeneration regime amounts to:
∆+(Zi) = − 1
ρζ
∫ xi+
xi
u′′(x)
[
ζx− αlZi
]
dx .
Integrating by parts, we obtain:
∆+(Zi) = − 1
ρζ
{
u′
(
xi+
) [
ζxi+ − αlZi
]− u′ (xi+) [ζxi − αlZi]
−ζ
∫ xi+
xi
u′(x)dx
}
.
After some standard manipulations, the net benefit may be given the follow-
ing expression:
B(Zi) = ∆+(Zi)−∆−(Zi)
=
1
ρζ
{
ζ
∫ xi+
xi
u′(x)dx− u′(xi+)
[
ζxi+ − αlZi
]}
,
hence:
dB
dZi
=
1
ρζ
{
−u′′ (xi+) [ζxi+ − αlZi] dxi+dZi + αlu′ (xi+)− αhu′(xi)
}
< 0 .
We conclude as follows:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique reversing level of the critical pollution
stock ZiR: 0 < Z
i
R < Z¯
i, under which the Best Switching Policy is the opti-
mal policy and over which the Best Maintaining Policy is the optimal one.
For Zi = ZiR the two policies are equivalent, meaning that once at Z
i, they
generate the same continuation values.
5 Characterizing the paths induced by the Best
Switching Policies
In this section we characterize the paths of the consumption rate and the
pollution stock induced by the B. S. P's. We show that over the range
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(0, Z¯i) choosing a B. S. P. always implies an upward jump of the resource
consumption rate at the switching date ti: x
i
− < x
i
+.
For characterizing the best paths from Z0 to Zi it is useful to look at the
social planner problem as the following problem:
max
x,ti
∫ ti
0
[u(x(t))− h (Z(t))] e−ρtdt+ e−ρti max{V m(Zi), V s(Zi)}(5.1)
s.t; (3.1) and Z(ti) = Z
i , (5.2)
to which must be added another constraint.
Expliciting the maximum time delay constraint for attaining Zi
Whatever the value of the second term of the above objective function
(5.1), as shown in Section 2 (see (2.5) with α = αh and (2.6)), the dynamics
of p and Z before the time ti at which Z
i is attained is given by the following
system of autonomous differential equations:
p˙(t) = (ρ+ αh)p(t)− ζh′ (Z(t)) (5.3)
Z˙(t) = ζxd (p(t))− αhZ(t) . (5.4)
In the (p, Z) plane only these parts of the trajectories corresponding to (5.3)-
(5.4) located under the locus pZh (Z) and permitting to attain Z
i have to be
considered, that is the part of the B. M. P. trajectory itself and the parts of
all trajectories located below, as illustrated in Figure 7.
Figure 7 here
Given the properties of autonomous systems, the lower is the trajectory
the shorter is the delay for attaining Zi starting from Z0 < Zi. Thus there
exists a maximum delay for attaining Zi while respecting the F.O.C's having
to be satisfied before ti, the delay of the B. M. P. Let us denote by t
m
i this
delay9. The additional constraint having to be taken into account to fully
specify the social planner problem reads:
tmi − ti ≥ 0 , (5.5)
9Clearly tmi is depending upon Z
i.
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equivalently:
pi − pi− ≥ 0 or xi− − xi ≥ 0 . (5.6)
We show that the constraint (5.5) is never effective for Zi ≤ ZiR and is binding
for Zi > ZiR.
5.1 Optimal B. S. P. paths. Case: Z0 < Zi < ZiR
Since Z0 < Zi < ZiR the B. S. P. is the optimal policy and the social planner
problem is simply:
max
x,ti
∫ ti
0
[u(x(t))− h(Z(t))] e−ρtdt+ e−ρtiV s(Zi)
s.t. (3.1) , (5.2) , (5.5) or (5.6) .
Assuming that (5.5) is not binding (we prove that it is the case later in
this sub-section), then the transversality condition is:
lim
t↑ti
H(t) +
∂
∂ti
[
e−ρtiV s(Zi)
]
= 0 , (5.7)
where H(t) is the present value Hamiltonian. After substitution for H and
V s (c.f. (4.2)):{
u(xi−)− h(Zi)− λi−
[
ζxi− − αhZi
]}
e−ρti = −ρe−ρtiV s(Zi)
= e−ρti
{
u(xi+)− h(Zi)− λi+
[
ζbxi+ − αlZi
]}
. (5.8)
Substituting u′(xi−)/ζ and u
′(xi+)/ζ for respectively λ
i
− and λ
i
+ and simpli-
fying, we get:
u(xi−)− u′(xi−)xi− + u′(xi−)
αh
ζ
Zi
= u′(xi+)− u′(xi+)xi+ + u′(xi+)
αl
ζ
Zi . (5.9)
Since αh 6= αl the above equation (5.9) cannot be satisfied for a common
value xs of the resource consumption rate at the switching date, we mean
that, whatever be xs, we cannot have: xi− = x
s = xi+.
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Remark that in the equation (5.9) xi+ is known: x
i
+ = x
d
(
pFl (Z
i)
)
. Thus
the equation (5.9) can be seen as an equation in xi− having to be determined
given xi+. To determine x
i
− let us proceed as follows.
Let Γk(x, Z
i) be the function:
Γk(x, Z
i) ≡ u(x)− u′(x)x+ u′(x)αk
ζ
Zi , k ∈ {h, l}
hence:
Γh(x, Z
i) > Γl(x, Z
i) (5.10)
∂Γk
∂x
= −1
ζ
u′′(x)
[
ζx− αkZi
]

< 0 , 0 < x <
αk
ζ
Zi
= 0 , x =
αk
ζ
Zi
> 0 ,
αk
ζ
Zi < x
(5.11)
∂Γk
∂Zi
= u′(x)
αk
ζ
> 0 (5.12)
For any Zi, Γk attains its minimum at x = αkZ
i/ζ10.
Now xi− appears as the solution of:
Γh(x, Z
i) = Γl(x
i
+, Z
i) (5.13)
The solution of this equation is illustrated in the below Figure 8:
Figure 8 here
10Note that:
∂2Γk
∂x2
= −1
ζ
u′′(x)
[
ζx− αkZi
]− u′′(x) ,
hence:
∂2Γk
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
x=
αk
ζ Z
i
= −u′′
(
αk
ζ
Zi
)
> 0 .
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Figure 8 has to be read starting from the known consumption rate xi+:
xi+ > αlZ
i/ζ11. Thus following the direction of the arrow, first Γl(x
i
+, Z
i)
is fixed,
(
xi+,Γl(x
i
+, Z
i)
)
being on the increasing part of the Γl curve. Next
switching from the Γl curve to the Γh curve at the common value Γl(x
i
+, Z
i),
xi− is identified as this value of x for which (5.13) is satisfied
12.
Thus along an optimal B. S. P. path, when at ti and the pollution stock
approaches its critical level Zi, then the consumption rate of the resource
jumps from xi− up to x
i
+, equivalently the full marginal cost of the resource
services must fall from pi− down to p
i
+ = p
F
l (Z
i).
This scheme works as far as xi− is at least equal to x
i, i.e. as far as (5.13)
has a solution, equivalently as far as (5.5) or (5.6) are not binding. To prove
it is the case for Zi < ZiR, we show that:
a. If xi+ > x
i, then xi is a decreasing function of Zi;
b. Assuming xi− = x
i implies that Zi = ZiR.
Since xi is an increasing function of Zi (xi = αhZ
i/ζ), then xi − xi− is a
decreasing function of Zi down to 0 at Zi = ZiR.
a. xii is a decreasing function of Z
i if xi− > x
i
Let us differentiate the transversality condition H(ti) = ρV
s(Zi), holding
when xi− > x
i, i.e. when (5.6) is not binding:
∂Γh
∂xi−
dxi− +
∂Γh
∂Zi
dZi − h′(Zi)dZi = ρdV
s(Zi)
dZi
dZi .
Remark that dV s/dZi = −λi+ = −u′(xi+)/ζ. Thus using the expressions
11Since Zi < Z¯i, then pFl (Z
i) < u′(xi) implies together with u′(xi) = pZh (Z
i) <
pZl (Z
i) = u′
(
αlZ
i/ζ
)
that xi+ = x
d
(
pFl (Z
i)
)
> αlZ
i/ζ.
12In Figure 8, the equation (5.10) has two solutions xi− and x
i′
−: x
i′
− < x
i < xi−. Clearly
xi
′
− is violating the constraint (5.6), while x
i
− is satisfying it.
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(5.11) and (5.12) for the partial derivatives of Γh, we get:
−1
ζ
u′′(xi−)
[
ζxi− − αhZi
]
dxi− + u
′(xi−)
αh
ζ
dZi − h′(Zi)dZi
= −ρ
ζ
u′(xi+)dZ
i .
Since xi− > x
i, then ζxi− − αhZi = Z˙(t−i ) > 0, and:
dxi−
dZi
=
1
u′′(xi−)
ρu′(xi+) + αhu
′(xi−)− ζh′(Zi)
Z˙(t−i )
.
The numerator of the second R.H.S. term may be rewritten as:[
(ρ+ αl)u
′(xi+)− ζh′(Zi)
]
+
[
αhu
′(xi−)− αlu′(xi+)
]
.
Since u′(xi+) = p
i
+ then the first term into brackets of the above sum is
nothing but than p˙(t+i ): p˙(t
+
i ) > 0 for Z
i < Z¯i ≤ Z∗h. Since αl < αh, and
xi+ > x
i
− implies u
′(xi+) < u
′(xi−), then the second term is also positive.
Hence:
dxi−
dZi
=
1
u′′(xi−)
p˙(t+i ) + αhu
′(xi−)− αlu′(xi+)
Z˙(t−i )
< 0 . (5.14)
b. Assuming xi− = x
i implies that Zi = ZiR
Let us assume that xi− = x
i so that ζxi− − αhZi = 0. Then:
H(t−i ) =
{
u(xi−)− h(Zi)− λi−
[
ζxi− − αhZi
]}
e−ρti
=
{
u(xi)− h(Zi)} e−ρti = − ∂
∂ti
[
e−ρtiV m(Zi)
]
.
But by (5.7) we have also H(ti) = − ∂∂ti [e−ρtiV s(Zi)], thus V m(Zi) = V s(Zi)
an equality which is satisfied iff Zi = ZiR according to the Proposition 2.
Although the size of the jump of the resource consumption rate at ti
cannot be easily characterized as a function of Zi, the fall in the full marginal
cost of the resource services can be shown to increase with Zi: Zi < ZiR.
From dpi−/dZ
i = u′′(xi−)dx
i
−/dZ
i and (5.14) we get:
dpi−
dZi
=
p˙(t+i ) + αhu
′(xi−)− αlu′(xi+)
Z˙(ti−)
> 0 ,
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as expected since dxi−/dZ
i < 0 and xd(p) is a standard demand function
decreasing with the price of the good.
Next, from:
dpi+
dZi
=
dpFl
dZ
∣∣∣∣
Z=Zi
=
p˙(t+i )
Z˙(t+i )
we obtain:
d
dZi
[
pi− − pi+
]
=
p˙(t+i )
Z˙(t−i )
+
αhu
′(xi−)− αlu′(xi+)
Z˙(t−i )
− p˙(t
+
i )
Z˙(t+i )
.
Since xi− < x
i
+ and αh > αl, then: Z˙(t
−
i ) < Z˙(t
+
i ) which implies:
p˙(t+i )
(
1
Z˙(t−i )
− 1
Z˙(t+i )
)
> 0 ,
and we conclude that:
d
dZi
[
pi+ − pi−
]
> 0 (5.15)
The resource services price fall increases with Zi and attains its maximum
at Zi = ZiR when p
i
− = p
i, i.e. when xi− = x
i.
The trajectories of the B. M. P. and B. S. P. paths for the case Z0 < Zi <
Z0R, in which the B. S. P. is the optimal policy are illustrated in the below
Figure 9.
Figure 9 here
5.2 Non optimal B. S. P. paths. Case Z0 < Zi and Z iR <
Z i < Z¯ i
In this case the B. S. P. is solving the same problem than in the preceding
sub-section 5.1, excepted that here its solution is not the solution of the
social planner problem since at ti the bad option is enforced. The problem
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is reminiscent of the Kydland and Prescott (1977) work on the temporal
consistency of policies and/or strategies, the 'rule' being to choose the self-
regeneration switch when at Zi while the 'discretion' would command to
maintain the high self-regeneration regime13.
We know from the analysis of the preceding sub-section that neglecting
the constraint (5.5) (or (5.6)) would result in a transversality condition at ti
which cannot be satisfied. Thus the constraint (5.5) must now be taken into
account and be given its due care. Let µ be the multiplier associated to the
constraint tmi − ti ≥ 0, so that the transversality condition has to be written
as follows:
lim
t↑ti
H(t) = ρV s(Zi) + µ
Equivalently xi− and µ must together solve:
Γh(x, Z
i) = Γl(x
i
+, Z
i) + µ , xi+ given : x
i
+ > x
i
µ ≥ 0 , xi− − xi ≥ 0 and µ
[
xi− − xi
]
= 0 .
The solution xi− = x
i and µ = Γh(x
i, Zi) − Γl(xi+, Zi) is illustrated in the
below Figure 10.
Figure 10 here
Since pi− = p
i is decreasing with Zi while pi+ is increasing because Z
i <
Z¯i < Z∗h, the size of the full marginal cost falls when at ti, p
i
−−pi+ = pi−pi+,
is now decreasing down to 0 when Zi tends to Z¯i after having attained its
maximum at Zi = ZiR.
The B. S. P. trajectory when Zi is higher than ZiR is illustrated in the
below Figure 11. Since pi− = p
i, then the initial part of the path from t = 0
to t = ti, equivalently from Z
0 to Zi, is the same than the initial part of the
B. M. P. path. The only difference is now that when at Zi the bad decision
is enforced14.
13The same remark holds for the B. M. P. path when Zi < ZiR, the rule being to maintain
the high self-regeneration rate αh rather than switch in this case.
14Note that when the B. M. P. path is chosen when Zi < ZiR, the other case of bad
decision when at Zi, then the first path of the B. M. P. path is not the same than the first
path of the B. S. P. path since in this case pi− < p
i.
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Figure 11 here
Summing up:
Proposition 3 Along the Best Switching Policies paths, whatever be Zi:
0 < Zi < Z¯i, the resource consumption path is discontinuous at t = ti when
the pollution stock attains its critical level Zi, jumping from xi−, x
i
− ≥ xi,
up to xi+, x
i
+ > x
i
−, meaning that the shadow marginal cost of the pollution
stock is falling down. The pollution stock is continuously increasing, but
its instantaneous growth rate Z˙(t) is discontinuous, jumping upwards at the
switch date. Furthermore:
a. For Zi lower than ZiR, the Best Switching Policy is the optimal policy
and xi− is decreasing with Z
i while xi is increasing so that the gap be-
tween the B. S. P. and the B. M. P. consumption rates when attaining
Zi, xi− − xi, is decreasing with Zi down to 0 when Zi tends to ZiR, si-
multaneously the size of the energy services price fall, pi−−pi+, increases
with Zi and attains its maximum when Zi = ZiR and p
i
− = p
i;
b. For Zi higher than ZiR, then x
i
− is blockaded at x
i and now the upward
jump xi+ − xi is decreasing with Zi down to 0 when Zi = Z¯i; the same
holds for the price fall pi − pi+ now decreasing with Zi down to 0 at
Zi = Z¯i.
6 Conclusion
The management of environmental catastrophes has received a lot of atten-
tion in the literature, such catastrophes being usually described as uncertain
events impacting negatively welfare. We depart from this approach by as-
suming first that the catastrophe is known to arise with certainty if some
critical threshold in terms of pollution concentration is overshot. Second,
we describe the catastrophe as an irreversible loss of the self-regenerating
capacity of the environment, thus constraining the ability of the economy to
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generate welfare after the catastrophe, an indirect welfare effect rather than
the direct welfare effect postulated in the earlier literature.
We have first examined the nature of this indirect effect by comparing
the optimal management policy of a polluting resource when the self-cleaning
capacity of the environment is either low or high. We show that higher self-
regeneration capacities imply in all cases a lower opportunity cost of pollution
and a higher consumption rate of the polluting resource in the long run. But
lower self-cleaning capacities of the environment does not necessarily im-
ply a higher long run pollution stock, this issue depending crucially upon
the resource demand function elasticity. A higher discount rate has the same
qualitative positive effect over the long run resource consumption than a bet-
ter assimilative capacity of the environment, but contrary to the ambiguous
effect of the self-cleaning capacity, it always increases the long run pollution
stock.
We have next considered the problem of a society having accumulated
pollution up to the catastrophic threshold and contemplating what to do
next: either maintain the high regeneration capacity of the environment of
either choosing to switch irreversibly toward the low self-regeneration regime.
We discuss the pro and con of these two options. Maintaining the high re-
generation regime allows to avoid an increased accumulation of damages in
the future but imposes a strong constraint upon consumption possibilities.
On the other hand, a higher trend of damages in the future may itself be
compensated by a higher consumption rate if the switch to the low regen-
eration regime is chosen, making the choice of the best option a non trivial
exercise.
Despite these potential ambiguities, we show that the choice problem
may be given a simple answer. There exists a unique critical level of the
catastrophic threshold, such that for thresholds below this tipping point,
it is better to overshoot the threshold and enter the low regime, while the
contrary happens above the tipping point, maintaining the high regime being
the society best choice.
We have next characterized the optimal policy in these two scenarios.
Starting from any initial pollution stock below the catastrophic threshold,
they are two phases paths, a first phase of convergence towards the thresh-
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old with a declining use of the polluting resource and an increasing trend of
damages resulting from pollution accumulation, and a second phase of either
constant consumption and damages level if the preservation option is chosen,
or either a declining consumption trend and an increasing damages trend if
the switching option is chosen. We show that switching requires an upward
jump of the resource consumption rate at the switching time. If preservation
is the optimal choice when attaining the threshold, the path converging to it
may be described as the 'slowest approach' towards the threshold, the time
delay for attaining it being the largest possible delay among the paths satis-
fying the optimality conditions and attaining the threshold. If the threshold
is lower than the tipping point, the optimal switching option will induce a
faster convergence towards the threshold than the best conservative transi-
tion path (a non optimal path in this case), being characterized by a higher
consumption rate and a faster trend of damages increase. Last we show that
in value terms, the fall down in resource implicit price at the switching time
increases with the level of the threshold when switching is the optimal option.
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Appendix
A.1 Appendix 1: Derivatives of Z∗ and p∗ with
respect to ρ and ζ.
Totally differentiating (2.11) and substituting u′(αZ/ζ) for ζh′(Z∗)/(ρ + α)
results in:
dZ∗
dρ
=
u′
−α(ρ+α)
ζ
u′′ − ζh′′ > 0
dZ∗
dζ
=
(ρ+ α)
[
α
Z∗u
′′ + u′
]
α(ρ+ α)u′′ − ζ2h′′ ,
hence:
dZ∗
dζ
T 0 according to: η∗ S 1 .
where u′ and u′′ are evaluated at x∗ = αZ∗/ζ and η∗ is the demand elasticity
evaluated at p∗ = u′(αZ∗/ζ).
Totally differentiating p∗ = u′(αZ∗/ζ) and substituting the above expres-
sions for dZ∗/dρ and dZ∗/dζ, we get:
dp∗
dρ
=
αu′ u′′
ζ2h2 − α(ρ+ α)u′′ < 0
dp∗
dζ
=
αu′′
[
1
ζ
h′′ + u′
]
ζ {α(ρ+ α)u′′ − ζ2h′′} > 0 .
A.2 Appendix 2: Properties of the V s(Z i) func-
tion
Let us start from:
V s(Zi) =
1
ρ
{
u′(xi+)− h(Zi)−
1
ζ
u′(xi+)
[
ζxi+ − αlZi
]} ≡ Vs(xi+, Zi) ,
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where xi+ solves u
′(x) = pFl (Z
i).
Thus:
∂Vs
∂Zi
=
1
ρζ
[−ζh′(Zi) + αlu′(xi+)] ,
∂Vs
∂xi+
= − 1
ρζ
u′′(xi+)
[
ζxi+ − αlZi
]
= − 1
ρζ
u′′(xi+)Z˙(t
+
i ) > 0 ,
dxi+
dZi
=
1
u′′(xi+)
dpFl
dZ
∣∣∣∣
Z=Zi
=
1
u′′(xi+)
p˙
Z˙
∣∣∣∣
t=t+i
< 0 ,
hence:
dV s
dZi
=
∂Vs
∂xi+
dxi+
dZi
+
∂Vs
∂Zi
=
[
− 1
ρζ
u′′(xi+)Z˙(t
+
i )
] [
1
u′′(xi+)
p˙(t+i )
Z˙(t+i )
]
+
1
ρζ
[−ζh′(Zi) + αlu′(xi+)]
=
1
ρζ
[−p˙(t+i )− ζh′(Zi) + αlu′(xi+)] . (A.2.1)
Remember that (c.f. (2.5)):
p˙(t+i ) = (ρ+ αl)p(t
+
i )− ζh′(Zi) = (ρ+ αl)u′(xi+)− ζh′(Zi) .
Hence substituting for p˙(t+i ) in (A.2.1), we get after simplifications:
dV s
dZi
= −1
ζ
u′(xi+) < 0 ,
and:
d2V s
d (Zi)2
= −1
ζ
u′(xi+)
dxi+
dZi
= −1
ζ
p˙
Z˙
∣∣∣∣
t=t+i
< 0 .
36
(JPA) 1.pdf
0 *Z?
Figure 1 : Optimal Paths under Speedy and Slow 
Selfregenerating Regimes
*
hZ Z
*P?
P
*
hP
•
•
( )ZP Z? ( )
PP Z? ( )FP Z?
( )FhP Z
( )PhP Z
( )ZhP Z( )FhP Z
( )FP Z?
37
(Val) 2 corr.pdf
0 iZ
Figure 2 : Best Maintaining Path: Path  
*
hZ Z
P
*
hP •   
( ) ( )'Ph
h
P Z h Zζ
ρ α
=
+
( )FhP Z
0Z =
( )F ihP Z
( )Z ihP Z
( )P ihP Z
0Z
( ) 'Z hhP Z u Z
α
ζ
 
=  
 
•   
•   
•   ( )M
( )M
38
(Val) 3 corr.pdf
0 
Figure 3 : Determination of  
*
hZ Z
P
*
hP
0 , hZ α α= =
( )'
h
h Zζ
α
( )
0 ,
. '
h
h
P
h Z
α α
ζ
ρ α
= =
+

' hu Zα
ζ
 
 
 
ˆ iZ
ˆ iZ
•   
39
(JPA) 4.pdf
0 iZ
Figure 4 : Determination of the Range             of Non Trivial
Choices between Best Maintaining and Best Switching Policies
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Figure 9 : Best Maintaining and Switching Paths. Case : 
B. M: Best Maintaining Path ; B.S: Best Switching Path.
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Figure 11 : Best Maintaining and Switching Paths. Case :  
   B. M: Best Maintaining Path ; B.S: Best Switching Path. 
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